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The authors use an original data set covering more 
than 400 recent natural disasters to analyze the 
determinants of international emergency aid. Although 
humanitarian need is a major determinant of emergency 
relief payments, the results imply that political and 
strategic factors play a crucial role in the emergency aid 
allocation. On average, donor governments favor smaller, 
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The magnitude and impact of recent disasters like Hurricane Katrina and the December 
2004 Tsunami have brought natural emergencies into the international spotlight. Rapid 
population growth, urbanization, environmental degradation and climate variability have 
increased the vulnerability to, and impact of, natural hazards, especially in less developed 
countries (Abramovitz, 2001). As a result, natural disasters have caused an average loss 
of 63,500 human lives annually, and affected more than 212 million people per year in 
the period from 1990 and 2005.
1  
 
Despite several initiatives towards disaster prevention
2, humanitarian relief remains the 
principal channel of support for countries hit by natural disasters. With a growing range 
of issues falling into the humanitarian agenda, and rising attention from national 
governments, total bilateral emergency aid has increased from US$ 3.2 billion to US$ 8.5 
billion between 1995 and 2005 (OECD, 2007). The increasing importance of emergency 
aid is also apparent in the size of emergency aid relative to total official development 
assistance (ODA), which has shifted from 5% in 1989 to 10.5% in 2000 (Macrae, 2002). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the objectives and criteria of humanitarian aid are well 
defined. The United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182 states that emergency 
assistance shall "..be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence" (United Nations RES/46/182, 1991, page 1).  
 
Humanitarian assistance is designed to alleviate human suffering in emergency situations, 
independent of race, citizenship and other political considerations. Despite these 
principles, concerns regarding the allocation of emergency aid have mounted over the last 
years, and international aid policies increasingly been exposed to criticism from both 
private aid organizations and the popular press (Darcy and Hofmann, 2003; IFRC, 2003; 
Olsen et al., 2003; Walker et al., 2005). In particular, humanitarian agencies engaged in 
relief operations have denounced the existence of "forgotten" or "silent" emergencies 
receiving little or no help from the international community, while other emergencies 
receive disproportionate amounts. With emergency aid determining not only the 
immediate fate of affected populations, but likely also affecting the medium to long run 
development of countries, these concerns are serious, and demand a closer analysis of 
international humanitarian aid. 
 
In this paper, we provide the first large scale analysis of emergency aid. Using a sample 
of more than 400 calamities occurring worldwide over the last 15 years, we analyze how 
the international community responds to humanitarian crises triggered by natural 
disasters, and evaluate the degree to which international aid flows reflect the 
humanitarian principles they are officially based upon. Narrowing the scope of our 
analysis to rapid onset natural emergencies
3, we take advantage of natural disasters as 
exogenous shocks allowing us to clearly distinguish humanitarian from politically or 
strategically based motivations. Once we control for disaster impact as measured by the 
  2number of people killed and affected, it becomes straightforward to test whether political 
and strategic factors affect the allocation of emergency aid. Since disaster related needs 
may depend on country specific conditions, we allow for a large set of socioeconomic 
factors in all of our empirical specifications. Our empirical work is divided into three 
parts. In the first part, we pool all donors to assess the average performance of donor 
governments. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the number of people 
affected increases the likelihood of receiving aid by 10 to 13 percentage points, while a 
one standard deviation increase in the number of people killed by a calamity increases the 
likelihood to receive aid by about 25 percentage points. Our results indicate that bilateral 
and strategic factors play a crucial role in the allocation of emergency aid. On average, 
donor governments provide significantly more aid to oil exporting countries, and give 
disproportionately more to geographically closer and politically less affine countries, as 
well as to their former colonies. 
 
In a second step, we take a closer look at the five most active donors in emergency aid, 
namely the US, Japan, Germany, the UK and Norway, and compare the aid patterns of 
these donors to private, non-governmental aid flows. We find that the factors driving the 
participation decision (selection) and the actual amounts of aid provided (allocation) vary 
substantially across donors. The US and the UK provide significantly more aid to oil 
exporting countries, a bias that cannot be detected in private emergency aid flows. 
Germany displays a significant "home bias", preferring closer emergencies to more 
distant ones. All of the five major donors except Japan seem to be more generous towards 
countries less politically aligned in their recent UN voting history, suggesting that 
emergency aid is used by donors for bridging the gap to countries with diverging foreign 
policy objectives. 
 
As a last step, we use our data set to analyze the degree of strategic interaction among 
donors. Instrumenting other donors’ aid responses with bilateral distance variables, we 
find strong evidence of bandwagon effects in the international allocation of emergency 
aid. On average, the likelihood to provide aid after a natural emergency increases by 15-
30 percentage points when any other major donor participates in the aid process. The 
work presented in this paper naturally complements and builds on the existing literature 
on the allocation of development aid. Starting with the pioneering works by McKinlay 
and Little (1977), a large number of studies have attempted to separate recipient needs 
(RN) from donors interests (DI) in the allocation of development aid. Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) find strong evidence for strategic biases towards former colonies and political 
allies, while Neumayer (2003) finds civil and political rights to be a major factor in aid 
allocation. Neumayer (2003a) analyzes the aid allocation of development banks and 
United Nations agencies and finds that most regional development banks focus 
exclusively on economic need of the recipient, while UN agencies also take human 
development aspects into account. Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) use a three-dimensional 
panel to test and reject the equality of aid criteria across donors, and stress the increasing 
importance of trade connections in the allocation of aid. Tarp et al. (1999) and 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) also estimate interactions among donors using total (per 
capita) commitments provided by other bilateral donors in their empirical specifications. 
While the first study points towards aid coordination among donors, Berthélemy and 
  3Tichit (2004) find that these results are not very robust to model specification
4. Round 
and Odedokun (2004) measure "peer pressure" as the total aid effort of all other donors as 
a fraction of their total GDP, and find peer pressure to have a positive and significant 
impact on the aid given by each donor. 
 
Closely related to this paper is also recent work by Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) on US 
disaster relief payments. The authors show that disaster types differ in terms of their news 
coverage or "newsworthiness", and highlight the significant and large effects of this 
media channel on the disaster aid allocation by US government agencies. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section two, we briefly discuss the role 
and size of emergency aid in the domain of international aid. We present the data in 
section three, our main empirical results in section four, and conclude with a short 
discussion and a summary.  
 
2 Emergency Aid vs. Development Assistance 
 
International aid is broadly divided into two categories: Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) and Humanitarian Assistance, commonly referred to as emergency aid. ODA 
consists of financial flows to developing countries aimed at the promotion of their 
economic development and welfare. To qualify for receiving this kind of assistance - 
which is by definition concessional and has a grant element of at least 25% - countries 
have to be classified as potential recipients by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC).
5 The main objective of ODA is the elimination of poverty and its principal 
causes, which implies considerable involvement of recipient countries in the negotiation 
and implementation of intermediate to long term programs. Humanitarian assistance, on 
the other hand, is meant to provide rapid assistance and distress relief to populations 
temporarily needing support after natural disasters, technological catastrophes or 
conflicts, generally classified as "complex emergencies"
6. Historically, humanitarian 
assistance has been considered a distinct form of aid mostly due to its ethic foundations 
in humanitarian law. The principles governing humanitarian assistance were to be 
reflected in the fact that donor governments perceive emergency aid as politically 
unconditional, while development assistance has always been conditional. Humanitarian 
aid does not target nations or states and their development, but individuals, independent 
of race, country or citizenship. 
 
In practice, the distinction between humanitarian and development aid is not always 
straightforward. Frequently, emergencies like civil wars or droughts spread over months, 
if not years; it is not clear, how medical facilities established during these kinds of events 
can be distinguished from generic investment into health infrastructure typically part of 
ODA programs. In the case of natural disasters, this distinction is generally less of an 
issue. As we will show in the following section, the vast majority of natural disasters are 
classified as "rapid onset", i.e. emergencies triggered by short lived causal phenomena 
requiring immediate and only temporary assistance. The short time horizon in which aid 
has to be delivered limits the room for negotiations between recipient and donor 
  4countries, and requires a serious (humanitarian) commitment of donors, who are 
generally also directly responsible for the coordination of the aid interventions. 
 
3 The Data 
 
3.1 Data Sources 
 
The main source of emergency data is the Emergency-Events Database (EM-DAT) 
maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
7. The 
EM-DAT database covers over 15,900 natural and technological disasters since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. A disaster is defined as "a situation or event which 
overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to the national or international level 
for external assistance, or is recognized as such by a multilateral agency or by at least two 
sources, such as national, regional or international assistance groups and the media".
8 
The entry criterion for an event to be classified as natural disaster is to either have caused 
at least 10 fatalities, affected at least 100 people, to have triggered a declaration of state 
of emergency, to have led to an appeal for international assistance, or a combination of 
any of the above criteria. EM-DAT draws from a variety of public sources, including 
reports by governments, insurance companies, press and aid agencies. In 2003, about 
27.9% of the data came from various US Government disaster agencies, 27% from 
insurance companies, 20% from UN organizations, 13.1% from press agencies, and the 
remaining 7% from various humanitarian organizations (Guha-Sapir et al., 2004). The 
EM-DAT database contains information on the severity of each disaster in terms of the 
total number of people killed (persons confirmed dead or missing and presumed dead) 
and affected (people requiring immediate assistance during the emergency period, 
including displaced or evacuated people).
9 From the EM-DAT we also get information 
on disaster type, country of occurrence and the timing of each emergency, which we use 
to merge disaster characteristics with funding records. The funding data we use in this 
paper, together with donors breakdown, come from the UN’s Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking System (FTS)
10. FTS data on 
natural disaster funding start in 1992 and include governments’, together with private, 
NGOs’ and international agencies’ responses to Consolidated Appeals.
11 These data are 
quite different from the ones in the OECD’s DAC system commonly used in the ODA 
terature.  li
 
Humanitarian aid as defined in the DAC reporting scheme ("emergency and distress 
relief") contains "sudden natural or man made disasters, including war or severe civil 
unrest, food scarcity conditions arising from crop failure owing to drought, pest and 
diseases, as well as support for disaster preparedness" (OECD, 2007). The DAC data on 
emergency aid does thus not only contain large amounts of complex emergency aid as 
discussed in the previous section, but also expenses made for disaster prevention and 
refugee support. Using the FTS data has three main advantages: first, while the DAC 
system provides only annual totals for each donor-recipient pair, FTS records aid 
provided for each appeal separately, hence allowing to link directly aid flows to each 
individual disaster. Second, as opposed to the DAC system which primarily focuses on 
OECD donors, the FTS tracks aid flows of multilateral and private donors, providing an 
  5interesting alternative dimension to be explored in our empirical section. Third, FTS is 
not restricted to developing countries, so that the recipient pool covers a much broader 
spectrum of socioeconomic backgrounds. One potentially important shortcoming of FTS 
data is that donors’ reporting to the OCHA system is on a voluntary basis. To evaluate 
the magnitude of potential under-reporting, we compare the FTS data used in this paper 
with DAC data in Figure 1 below. While the DAC numbers are significantly higher than 
the numbers from the FTS on aggregate, differences are only minor once we exclude 
omplex emergencies.
12 
igure 1: FTS and DAC Data on Emergency Aid] 
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escription of the variables used are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
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We complete the data set with socioeconomic information on recipient countries from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006) and distance data from Gleditsch and 
Ward (2001). As proxy for the political ties between donors and recipient countries, we 
use the Gartzke index of similarity in states’ voting patterns in the United Nations 





Total aid granted by the international community for the 491 emergencies in our sample 
amounts to US$ 3.06 billion dollars
13. Total aid includes bilateral and multilateral aid, as 
well as donations from private sources. In Figure 2, we show a break down of total aid by 
state or institution, and rank donors in terms of the total amount granted and in terms of 
the number of emergencies assisted. The USA is the leading donor both in terms of the 






As shown in Tables 1a and 1b, the degree of coordination within the international 
community is rather small. The correlation of aid interventions is strictly below 0.5 
(Table 1a) whereas the correlation of the actual amount given (Table 1b) ranges from 
0.59 between Germany and Japan to only 0.18 between Norway and the United States. In 
Figure 3, we summarize total contributions by donor and year. Total contributions vary 
significantly across years, and do not show a clear time trend for any donor. The 
aggregate data show little evidence of fixed annual budgets, and the correlation between 
total expenditure per country and the number of calamities appears fairly low. Another 
important source of variation in our data set is the geographic distribution of disasters. On 
aggregate, Asia has the largest number of disasters, with South and South-East Asian 
countries accounting for 73% of disasters over the entire period. Of the 111 recipient 
countries in our sample, Indonesia is the most exposed one, with 25 natural disasters, 
followed by India (18), and the Philippines (16). Floods are the most frequent natural 
disaster type, repres
e
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[Table 1a: Correlation of Aid Interventions Among Major Donors] 
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her death toll, whereas 
ow onset disasters tend to affect larger shares of the population. 
 Empirical Strategy 
on equation only, and then jointly estimate selection and allocation in a second 
ep.  
under the assumption that the factors driving aid decisions are the 
me across donors. 
effects, we use bilateral controls to 
strument for other donors’ participation decision. 
[Table 1b: Correlation of Aid Amounts Among Major
[Figure 3: Total Emergency Aid by Y
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Strong differences in terms of human impact, measured by the number of people killed 
and affected
14, are also visible across disaster types. Natural emergencies can be broadly 
classified into rapid onset emergencies lasting only for short periods of time such as 
earthquakes or floods, and slow onset emergencies, such as droughts or epidemics, which 
affect populations for longer time periods, in some cases even years. As shown in Table 





The main goal of our analysis is to determine the factors driving donors’ interventions, 
and to clearly distinguish the relative importance of disaster impact and aid need from 
factors reflecting donors’ strategic and political considerations. As shown in the previous 
section, the US as the most "active" donor country provides aid for about half of the 
emergencies in our sample, and participation probabilities are significantly lower for all 
other donors. The median number of donors for each emergency is five, with one quarter 
of all emergencies being assisted by no more than three donors. Given the low average 




We structure our empirical analysis into three parts. In the first part, we exploit our data 
set’s multidimensionality by taking emergency-donor pairs as unit of analysis in a panel 
setup similar to previous work on ODA by Berthélemy and Tichit (2004). This approach 
allows us to estimate the importance of each of our explanatory variables for the average 
donor in our sample 
sa
 
In the second part of our analysis, we loosen this restriction, and allow bilateral effects to 
differ across donors by switching our analysis to the individual donor level. We focus on 
the five major donors and separately estimate both selection (Probit model) and allocation 
(Tobit model) equations. In the last part of our empirical section, we allow for 
interactions between donors and test the degree to which each donor’s participation 
probability depends on other donors’ actions. To deal with the endogeneity concerns 
arising in the estimation of strategic interaction 
in
 
The set of explanatory variables used in our empirical analysis can be divided into five 
broad categories: measures of disaster impact (DI) measures of socioeconomic 
  7background (SE) policy performance variables (PP) measures of bilateral relations 
) and other additional controls (OC). 
ediate assistance during the emergency period, 
hich includes displaced or evacuated people. One potential empirical concern regards 
uld be negligible. Finally, to control for 
otential differences in the measurement of impact, we use disaster type dummies (flood, 
pecifications. 
2004), low levels of 
evelopment of an economy can amplify the risk that a natural event translates into a 
 of infectious diseases may be higher. On the other hand, densely 
opulated areas may have better local networks and thus be able to recover more easily 
increase local’s population need for foreign assistance, but at the same time 
wer the effectiveness of financial flows and thus the potential to help from a foreign 
between donor and recipient (BR
 
4.1 Disaster Impact Measures 
 
Our main measures for humanitarian need and disaster impact are the number of people 
affected and the number of people killed in each emergency. In the EM-DAT system, a 
person is registered as killed if confirmed dead, missing or presumed dead. A person is 
counted as affected if she requires imm
w
the exogeneity of humanitarian impact. 
 
If international support was quickly and effectively disbursed, it could reduce 
emergencies’ human impact, and thus induce a downward bias to our estimates. To 
minimize this problem, we restrict our sample to rapid onset emergencies (449 
observations). Rapid onset emergencies usually last less than one day, so that the direct 
effect of aid on our disaster impact variables sho
p
windstorm, fire etc.) in all of our s
 
4.2 Socioeconomic Background 
 
The socioeconomic indicators included are GDP per capita, population (in logs), and 
population density. While higher per capita income reduces the risk to be affected by 
natural disasters ex-ante, it is likely to be the most important measure for the degree to 
which exposed countries can cope with the damage inflicted by natural disasters
15. In 
general, as highlighted by the UNDP’s report (United Nations, 
d
disaster, as well as the extent of the severity of the losses incurred. 
 
Larger countries are ex-ante more likely to have disasters, but should generally also be 
more able to deal with a shock of a given size. More densely populated areas may be 
prone to suffer more in the aftermath of natural disasters’ as evacuation possibilities can 
be limited and the risk
p
after natural hazards.  
 
4.3 Policy Performance Variables 
 
To account for structural differences in recipients’ ability to cope with natural disasters, 





  8The main policy performance indicators we use in our analysis are the Freedom House 
Index (Freedom House, 2007), trade openness (imports plus exports over GDP) and 
ethnic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The Freedom House Index assigns an 
annual score for civil and political freedom on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) 
to each country. We add both scores to get an overall democracy index.
16 High Freedom 
House scores are generally associated with "good" institutions such as property rights, 
dividual liberties, free information flows and low corruption. Such institutions may 
arkets, and should thus be more able to 
ooth negative shocks relative to less open countries. On the other hand, open 
ergency 
id particularly efficient in open economies. 
ontrol for oil exporting countries to capture the potential 
rategic relevance of recipients, and Gartzke’s affinity index measuring bilateral political 
f 1 of this index implies that the donor and the recipient always voted the same 
ay, while a value of -1 implies that the two countries never agreed. Both of these 
d to capture donors’ strategic and political objectives in the aid 
rocess. 
isasters in a given year and other exogenous shocks to 
onor’s budget constraints, we include year fixed effects in all of our specifications. In 
the panel regressions, we also allow for donor fixed effects to control for differences in 
the average likelihoods of giving. 
in
increase the potential of affected countries to deal with disasters themselves, but may also 
facilitate and encourage the provision of foreign emergency aid. 
 
Higher fractionalization is generally associated with higher risk of internal conflicts, 
lower provision of public goods and higher inequality levels (Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Fractionalization likely decreases the 
population’s capacity to deal with external shocks especially in the case of minority 
groups, but also limits the degree to which foreign aid can reach its targets. We also 
control for trade openness in our specifications, since open countries are generally more 
integrated into the international financial m
sm
economies may have the better infrastructure for foreign aid transfers, making em
a
 
4.4 Bilateral Relations and Strategic Factors 
 
We define bilateral relations as broadly as possible to test the degree to which economic, 
historical and political ties shape the allocation of aid after natural disasters. The two 
most frequently used bilateral measures are distance and prior colonial status. The 
geographical distance variable we use measures the distance between the capital of the 
donor and the capital of the recipient (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001). Although distance is 
commonly used as a proxy for bilateral trade, distance may also capture the relative cost 
of providing help, especially if aid is provided in kind as it is often the case after natural 
disasters. We also add a c
st
alignment as the correlation of historical voting patterns in the United Nations General 







4.5 Other Controls 
 
To control for the total number of d
d
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To limit concerns regarding potential feedback effects from aid to the explanatory 
variables, we use one year lags of all time-varying recipient specific and bilateral 
ariables in all of our empirical specifications. 
 Empirical Results 
.1 Part I: Panel Estimation 
 is by definition left censored at zero the equation to be 







Given that emergency aid
e
max(0, ), ij ij ij aid x u β = +    
 
Where  aidij s the amount of aid donor i provides for disaster  j.  x is the vector of 
explanatory variables and  (0, ). ij uN σ   Building on the independent variable groupings 
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where i refers to the donor
17 and j to the emergency. DI are the disaster impact measures, 
and SE and PP are the socioeconomic and policy performance indicators of the country 
affected by disaster, BI is our vector of donor-recipient bilateral controls, and Γ is a 
ector containing donor, year, disaster type and regional fixed effects. 
the dep
rovides positive amounts of aid 
v
 
We start our analysis with the participation (selection) equation. Empirically, this 
involves estimating a binary response model, where  endent variable is the 
probability that donor i p 1 ij give =  in response to disaster 
 which can be stated as 
 
j,
() ( 1 |) ( 0 |) . ij ij p xP g i v e xP x u x β ≡= = + >  
 
Having estimated the initial selection process, we estimate the actual amounts of aid 
given in a Tobit model in a second step. While the Tobit estimates are likely to suffer 
from measurement error in the recorded aid amounts, estimating the aid allocation allows 
us to determine the actual magnitude of the detected effects under the assumption that the 
factors driving the probability of giving are identical to the factors driving the actual 
mount given (Wooldridge, 2002)
 18. 
regional and disaster type dummies only. In the second column, we add donor fixed 
a
 
The results from the Probit estimation of the selection equation are summarized in Table 
3 below. In the first specification (Column1), we pool all donors and include year, 




Estimating the Probit model in the pooled sample corresponds to treating the full data set 
as cross-section, thus assuming independence across observations, i.e. that there is no 
correlation between donors’ actions for a given emergency. As this assumption is likely 
violated in the presence of unobservable disaster specific effects, the estimates from the 
pooled Probit are consistent but not efficient. 
 
To deal with this problem we fit a Random Effect Probit Model (column 3). The RE 
Probit model allows to control for unobservable omitted factors specific to each 
emergency. Disaster specific unobservable effects may include media coverage, physical 
damage and similar unobservable shocks. The key underlying assumption for the RE 
estimator to be consistent is the independence of the unobservable effects from the full 
set of regressors, an assumption which is not necessarily satisfied in our framework
20. To 
deal with potential correlations of unobservable effects with the included covariates we 
apply a conditional Logit model in columns 4 of the table. The functional assumptions 
underlying the conditional maximum likelihood Logit model allow consistent estimation 
independent of the distribution of unobserved effects (Wooldridge, 2002).The results are 
highly consistent with the random effect model, implying that the correlation between 
unobservable effects and our main covariates seems to be of rather minor importance. As 
further robustness check, we also estimate a conditional Logit model with emergency 
specific fixed effects. This specification allows us to perfectly control for emergency 
specific unobservables, but restricts the estimates to bilateral factors and to those 
disasters where at least one donor provides aid and at least one donor does not. Since the 
incidental parameter problem may potentially bias the maximum likelihood Probit 
estimates, we also estimate the same set of models with ordinary least squares model - the 
results of the OLS estimation are shown in Appendix A.3 and are nearly identical to the 
maximum likelihood estimates. 
 
Overall, the results emerging from the panel analysis are highly consistent across 
estimators and specifications. As expected, both the number of people affected and the 
number of people killed have a positive and highly significant effect on the aid decision. 
A one standard deviation increase in the number of people affected (22.9 Million people, 
2.6 in logs) increases the likelihood of receiving aid by 10-13 percentage points
21. The 
effect of the number of people killed is about twice as large: a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of people killed (3054 people in levels, 1.9 in logs) increases the 
likelihood to receive emergency aid by around 20 percentage points. 
 
While density does not seem to play a major role in the aid decision, population size and 
GDP per capita show the expected negative sign. Larger and richer countries can cope 
with natural disasters more easily, and are thus less dependent on foreign assistance. In 
line with our mostly ambiguous priors, none of the policy variables appears to have a 
significant effect on the final aid allocation. 
 
  11Most remarkable are the estimated coefficients on geographical distance, oil, former 
colony status and political affinity. Our point estimates imply that each 1000 km of 
distance between donor and recipient reduces the likelihood to receive aid by 1-2 
percentage points, a magnitude likely too big to be explained by purely logistical issues. 
Also, former colonies and oil exporters appear to get significant preferential treatment in 
the international aid process; on average, being an oil exporter increases the likelihood to 
receive aid by 10-15 percentage points, while former colonies are 25-30 percentage 
points more likely to receive aid after natural disasters. 
 
As opposed to previous results in the ODA literature (Alesina and Dollar, 2000), we find 
that donors are more likely to provide emergency aid to countries traditionally not 
aligned in their voting patterns. For the average donor, a one standard deviation decrease 
in the affinity index (0.25) increases the average likelihood to receive aid by 10-12 
percentage points. Donors seem to use emergency aid to improve weak diplomatic 
relations rather than to reward countries with traditionally aligned political interests. If 
the acquisition of international consensus is on donors’ political agenda, emergency aid 
may well be a more visible, cheaper and more flexible tool to reach such a consensus 
than traditional development assistance. Emergency donations are significantly smaller in 
size than typical ODA transfers, and are typically delivered directly by donors’ officials 
providing increased visibility to the donor. The behavior of the US and Australia in the 
aftermath of the December 2004 Tsunami towards Indonesia is a good example of such 
behavior. Indonesia traditionally appears as not aligned to the US voting patterns in the 
UN General Assembly, with a deteriorating trend in affinity since the 1999 crisis in East 
Timor strongly condemned by the Clinton administration. Similarly, diplomatic relations 
with Australia have been very complicated in recent years. Despite this, both Australia 
and the US provided particularly generous support to Indonesia in the aftermath of the 
Tsunami. A related statement by the US Secretary of State Colin Powell nicely illustrates 
the underlying logic: "We’d be doing this regardless of religion, [...] but I think it does 
give the Muslim world an opportunity to see American generosity, American value in 
action [...] And I hope that, as a result of our helicopter pilots being seen by the citizens 
of Indonesia helping them, that value system of ours will be reinforced" (The Economist, 
2005). 
 
[Table 3: Panel: Probit Analysis] 
 
Table 4 below shows the results for the Tobit estimates. The results are nearly identical 
with respect to sign and significance of the explanatory variables. A 10 percent increase 
in the number of agents killed increases the total amount of aid received by about 25 
percent, while a 10 percent increase in population has exactly the opposite effect. More 
importantly, the Tobit estimates strongly underline the relative importance of bilateral 
factors. Every 1000 kilometers of distance between capitals decreases aid by around 50%. 
The effects of affinity and colonial origin are even larger. A one standard deviation in 
affinity (0.25) increases aid by a factor or 50, and the effect of being a former colony is 
still larger. Even when the marginal effects are calculated conditional on the non-
censored range, these effects remain surprisingly large; conditional on non-censored 
outcomes, the marginal effects of affinity and colonial status are -3.9 and 1.79 
  12respectively, which implies that a one standard deviation decrease in affinity raises aid by 
about 200 percent, while being a former colony implies aid flows about five times as big 
as observed for comparable disasters.  
 
[Table 4 : Panel: Tobit Analysis] 
 
5.2 Part II: Individual Donor Analysis 
 
In the previous section, we implicitly assumed that the factors driving bilateral aid 
decisions were the same across donors. In this section, we determine the factors driving 
aid for each donor separately, and directly test the restrictions imposed in the panel 
analysis presented before. For expositional convenience, we limit our analysis to the five 
major donors in our sample - the US, Japan, Germany, the UK and Norway, which alone 
represent more than the 40% of total humanitarian aid - and confront their aid patterns to 
those of private donors. With scarce disaggregate data on private donations, total non-
governmental donations is the only proxy for "private" donations generally available in 
the FTS data. While this variable is a useful benchmark for the country specific results, 
its aggregate nature makes the interpretation of the estimated coefficients rather difficult. 
 
Table 5 below reports the coefficients for the Probit models estimated for each donor and, 
in the last column, the Wald test for the equality of coefficients across them. All donors 
are more likely to intervene in emergencies characterized by a higher death toll and a 
larger number of people affected, although these effects are only partially significant for 
Japan and private donors. 
 
With respect to our socioeconomic controls, all donors are more likely to intervene in 
favor of less populated potential recipients, even though this effect is not significantly 
different from zero for the US. This effect is similar to what is found in the aid literature 
(Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004), and, as discussed in the previous section likely reflects 
donors’ evaluations of the recipient’s capacity to deal with the disaster.
22 While Japan 
seems marginally more likely to provide aid to more densely populated countries, the 
opposite is true for Norway. Only private donors and the UK are more likely to help 
poorer countries. The positive and highly significant coefficient on the oil indicator found 
in the panel regression applies only to the US the UK and Norway, who are 24, 35 and 39 
percentage points more likely to help oil exporting than other countries, respectively. 
 
Among the five major donors analyzed, Norway is the one showing the highest 
responsiveness to policy performance indicators. In particular, one standard deviation 
change in trade openness, as measured by total trade value over GDP, reduces Norway’s 
likelihood to provide aid by 14 percentage points. The same negative response is 
displayed by private donors (16% decrease). Norway also appears to be hesitant to donate 
to ethnically fractionalized countries. 
 
Moving from the least to the most ethnically fractionalized background reduces the 
likelihood to receive aid from Norway’s by a remarkable 38 percentage points
23. 
 
  13[Table 5: Individual Donors: Probit Analysis] 
 
As to the Gastil index, the US is more likely to help more free and democratic countries 
whereas for Norway the opposite holds. In particular a 3 point increase in the freedom 
index (i.e. if the recipient is three points less "free") decreases the US giving probability 
by 10%, while increases Norway’s one by 14 percentage points. Similarly diverging 
patterns emerge from donors’ response to (bilateral) geographical distance. Germany is 
66 percentage points more likely to give to the closest recipient with respect to the most 
remote one, whereas the US are 70 percentage points more likely to give to the most 
distant as compared to the least distant recipient. However, the interpretation of these 
coefficients is to be taken with caution as all the specifications contain region fixed 
effects. On the other hand, all donors are more likely to give to less aligned countries, 
confirming previous results from the panel analysis. The test for equal coefficients among 
donors cannot be rejected. 
 
In Figure 4 we plot the predicted probability of each donor’s giving against the respective 
values for the bilateral affinity index
24. The variation in bilateral affinity index varies 
considerably between donors. When computing differences in fully standardized 
coefficients, it turns out that one standard deviation increase in affinity index lowers the 
probability of providing aid by 0.15 standard deviations for the US and by 0.36 standard 
deviations for Norway. 
 
[Figure 4: Donors’ Responsiveness and Bilateral Affinity] 
 
Last, formal colonial ties increase the UK’s intervention probability by 29 percentage 
points. The patterns emerging from the aid allocation (Tobit) estimation are nearly 
identical as shown in Table 6 below. All donors respond strongly to the humanitarian 
need generated by emergencies, even though the estimated coefficients on the death toll 
vary significantly across donors. As discussed before in the panel regressions, the 
magnitude of bilateral considerations is considerable. 
 
[Table 6: Individual Donors: Tobit Analysis] 
 
5.3 Part III: Strategic Interaction 
 
The last question we address in this paper is the interaction between donors in the 
international aid process. The literature on ODA allocation has treated other donors’ 
actions as exogenous, finding mixed results on the direction of such interactions (Tarp et. 
al., 1999, Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004, Round and Odedokun, 2004). While it is 
conceivable that governments may be exposed to international "peer pressure" or may 
want to profit from economies of scale in the provision of aid, donor governments may 
also view other donors’ donations as substitutes for their own aid and thus reduce their 
contributions with increasing aid from others. 
 
[Figure 5: Donor Participation Patterns] 
 
  14In our analysis we focus on the interactions between the most active donors analyzed in 
the previous section: the US, Japan, Germany, the UK and Norway. These five donors are 
not only the most active ones, but also fairly good predictors of the international aid 
response as summarized in Figure 5. The average number of other OECD donors 
responding to each emergency increases from 0.47 when none of the major donors 
intervenes to 7.07 when all of them respond. The main advantage of focusing only on the 
five principal donors is that we can build on the results presented in the previous section 
and use the bilateral variables relevant for each individual donor as instruments in a Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) setup. 
 
The results of the 2SLS estimation are summarized in Table 7 below. In addition to the 
full set of covariates used in the previous section, we now include the number of other 
main donors providing aid for a given emergency, which we instrument with bilateral 
distance in the first stage regressions. We test the validity of our instruments with the 
Sargan/Hansen overidentification test; p-values between 0.14 (Germany) and 0.98 (UK) 
imply that the null of instrument validity cannot be rejected. Given the large set of 
controls included in our specification, the predictive power of our instruments is limited. 
As shown at the bottom of Table 7, the Cragg-Donald F-statistics ranges between 4.56 
(Germany) and 7.21 (US); as a result, our estimates are likely to display some of the 
upward bias expected for basic OLS estimates in our setup. A Cragg-Donald statistic of 
6.4 implies a maximum relative IV bias of 20 percent in our setup (Stock and Yogo, 
2005). Even though this implies that our point estimates are likely to be upward biased at 
the margin, our results provide evidence for positive and highly significant interaction 
among donors. Our point estimates imply that the likelihood to provide aid for a given 
disaster increases between 19.2 (US) and 33.6 (Germany) percentage points with each 
other major donor committing to provide help for a given disaster. 
 
[Table 7: Donor Interaction. IV Estimates] 
 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have used a sample of more than 400 recent natural disasters to 
systematically evaluate the degree to which humanitarian need is reflected in 
international humanitarian aid flows. We have shown that donor governments are on 
average significantly more generous towards geographically closer, politically less affine 
and oil exporting countries. We also find significant biases in favor of former colonies, 
and evidence for herding in the international aid process. While the extent of the various 
biases varies significantly across countries, the correlation between the current allocation 
of aid and the actual humanitarian losses associated with natural disasters is surprisingly 
low. While we have presented some evidence on private donations in this paper, data 
limitations have prevented us from going further into the details of private aid and its 
determinants. Given the growing role of the private sector in the humanitarian field, more 
studies on the interaction of private contributions in general, and the interaction of private 
preferences with domestic media in particular, appear desirable.  
 
  15From a policy perspective, our findings do not necessarily imply that government 
agencies behave suboptimally. Even though the aid patterns detected in this paper stand 
in stark contrast to the official international commitment to a purely humanitarian use of 
emergency aid, discretionary choice in the allocation of aid may well reflect the 
preferences or interests of underlying populations and electorates. Nevertheless, recent 
developments in the international political sphere indicate that at least some countries 
have recognized the need for improvements in the allocation of humanitarian aid. In a 
first meeting in 2003, sixteen of the major donors joined forces in the Good Humanitarian 
Donorship Initiative working towards more efficiency and higher degrees of 
accountability within humanitarian assistance. In a related effort, former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan officially launched the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) 
as central tool to provide immediate and impartial humanitarian aid to regions 
experiencing humanitarian crisis in March of 2006. Both initiatives appear steps into the 
right direction from a humanitarian policy perspective. 
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Table 1a: Correlations of Aid Interventions Among Major Donors 
 
US Japan Germany UK Norway
US 1.00
Japan 0.31 1.00
Germany 0.27 0.22 1.00
UK 0.25 0.43 0.32 1.00






Table 1b: Correlations of Aid Amounts Among Major Donors 
US Japan Germany UK Norway
US 1.00
Japan 0.53 1.00
Germany 0.52 0.59 1.00
UK 0.29 0.36 0.29 1.00
Norway 0.18 0.53 0.35 0.25 1.00
 
 








Cold or Heat Waves 2 120 218,734
Drought 28 155 16,600,000
Epidemic 2 34 24,801
Wild Fires 9 12 34,083
Rapid Onset Disasters
Earthquake 76 1,441 310,855
Flood 243 376 5,477,815
Slides 14 266 114,920
Volcano 14 44 38,557
Wind Storm 102 289 512,410
 
  25Table 3. Panel: Probit Analysis 
 
 
Dependent variable: Pr(Donor j provides aid after disaster i  =1) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Pooled  Probit  Pooled Probit 









Impact measures         
Log(Nr.affected)  0.099*** 0.116*** 0.116***  0.215***   
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)  (0.024)   
Log(Nr.  Killed)  0.199*** 0.233*** 0.233***  0.417***   
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.028)   
Socio economic indicators:         
Log(Population)  -0.204*** -0.221*** -0.221***  -0.423***   
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.052)   
Pop. density  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)   
Log (GDP per capita)  -0.146***  -0.175*** -0.175***  -0.291***   
  (0.043) (0.045) (0.046)  (0.081)   
Oil  dummy  0.324*** 0.391*** 0.391***  0.661***   
  (0.068) (0.073) (0.073)  (0.129)   
Policy performance indicators        
Trade  openness  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.003   
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003)   
ELF  index  -0.044 -0.007 -0.007  0.003   
  (0.112) (0.120) (0.126)  (0.217)   
Gastil  index  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.001   
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.019)   
Bilateral relation indicators        
Geograph. Distance  -0.018*  -0.036***  -0.036***  -0.056***  -0.086*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.017) 
Affinity  index  -1.414*** -1.299*** -1.299***  -2.377***  -2.749*** 
  (0.101) (0.259) (0.263)  (0.469)  (0.820) 
Former  colony  0.519*** 0.632*** 0.632***  1.067***  1.354*** 
  (0.096) (0.112) (0.112)  (0.192)  (0.216) 
         
Donor FE  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Disaster  FE  NO NO NO  NO  YES 
         
Observations  5153 5153 5153  5153  4754 
Pseudo R-squared  0.16  0.28    0.18  0.31 






LR chi2(38)   
903.8 
LR chi2(22)     
1117.9 
Notes: 
Coefficients reported; robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All specifications include year, regional and disaster type fixed effects. 
The donors included are.Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US 
 
  26Table 4: Panel: Tobit Analysis 
 
Dependent variable: log(1+aid) donor j provides aid after disaster i 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
  Pooled-Tobit  Pooled-Tobit FE  RE-Tobit DOFE  Tobit EMFE 
Impact measures       
Log(Nr.affected)  1.269*** 1.271*** 1.271***   
  (0.153) (0.140) (0.140)   
Log(Nr.  Killed)  2.497*** 2.483*** 2.483***   
  (0.179) (0.163) (0.163)   
Socio economic indicators:       
Log(Population)  -2.488*** -2.327*** -2.327***   
  (0.316) (0.308) (0.308)   
Pop.  density  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
Log (GDP per capita)  -1.982***  -1.994***  -1.994***   
  (0.532) (0.488) (0.488)   
Oil  dummy  4.023*** 4.136*** 4.136***   
  (0.850) (0.777) (0.777)   
Policy performance indicators      
Trade  openness  -0.015 -0.013 -0.013   
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)   
ELF index  -0.423  0.077  0.077   
  (1.427) (1.323) (1.323)   
Gastil  index  0.034 0.035 0.035   
  (0.123) (0.115) (0.115)   
Bilateral relation indicators      
Geograph.  Distance       
  -0.235** -0.384***  -0.384***  -0.451*** 
Affinity  index  (0.099) (0.089) (0.089)  (0.078) 
  -16.636*** -13.586*** -13.586***  -12.952*** 
Former  colony  (1.152) (2.729) (2.729)  (3.579) 
  6.600*** 7.077*** 7.077***  7.089*** 
  (1.180) (1.172) (1.172)  (0.983) 
       
Donor FE  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Disaster  FE  NO NO NO  NO 
       
Observations  5153 5153 5153  5153 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.07 0.12 0.12  0.20 
Notes: 
Coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All specifications include year, regional and disaster type fixed effects. 
The donors included are.Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US 
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Impact measures: 
Log(Nr.affected) 0.121





 (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.049)  (0.221) 





*** 0.020  18.89 
 (0.063)  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.060)  (0.002) 
Socio economic indicators: 






 (0.107)  (0.123)  (0.120)  (0.125)  (0.134)  (0.097)  (0.018) 
Pop. density  0.001  -0.003
** -0.000  -0.001 0.002
* 0.000  11.02 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.051) 
Log (GDP per capita)  -0.184  -0.052  -0.175  -0.340
* -0.226  -0.489
*** 5.51 
 (0.171)  (0.188)  (0.181)  (0.193)  (0.189)  (0.174)  (0.357) 
Oil dummy  0.621
** -0.398  0.367  0.896
*** 1.046
*** 0.438  25.52 
 (0.278)  (0.275)  (0.290)  (0.330)  (0.324)  (0.282)  (0.000) 
Policy performance indicators: 
Trade openness  0.002  0.000  -0.002  -0.012  -0.014
** -0.014
*** 12.34 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.031) 
ELF index  -0.171  -0.030  -0.552  -0.050  -1.069
** 0.283  5.48 
 (0.486)  (0.510)  (0.495)  (0.562)  (0.526)  (0.435)  (0.360) 
Gastil index  -0.083
** 0.023  -0.017  0.009 0.112
** -0.005  12.44 
 (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.039)  (0.029) 
Bilateral relation indicators: 
Geogr. Distance  0.153
** 0.016  -0.125
* 0.103 0.097    9.33 
 (0.077)  (0.108)  (0.064)  (0.095)  (0.108)    (0.053) 
Affinity index  -0.809
* -1.653  -2.059
* -1.813
** -3.866
**   7.43 
 (0.584)  (1.312)  (1.272)  (1.070)  (1.473)    (0.115) 
Former colony        0.746
**      
       (0.341)       
              
Nr. Obs  270  269  270  270  270  270    
              
Pseudo R
2 0.182  0.228  0.260  0.385  0.304  0.251   
LR chi2  67.503  84.837  97.053  142.937  110.772  92.646    
p-value (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
              
Notes:            
(A) Additional controls in all specifications: region, disaster type and year dummies. All models include a constant term. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(B)  Wald test of equal coefficients across donors. p -values in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. 
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 (0.323)  (0.349)  (0.169)  (0.364)  (0.395)  (0.180)  (0.266) 







 (0.391)  (0.437)  (0.209)  (0.437)  (0.463)  (0.220)  (0.000) 
Socio economic indicators: 






 (0.711)  (0.863)  (0.400)  (0.829)  (0.975)  (0.339)  (0.001) 
Pop. density  0.004  -0.023  -0.002  -0.006  0.020
** 0.002  14.47 
 (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.013) 




 (1.146)  (1.332)  (0.617)  (1.273)  (1.385)  (0.596)  (0.416) 






 (1.833)  (2.000)  (0.997)  (2.109)  (2.409)  (1.033)  (0.000) 
Policy performance indicators: 




 (0.037)  (0.042)  (0.020)  (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.016)  (0.002) 
ELF index  -1.778  0.372  -0.633  0.624  -9.084
** 0.927  7.45 
 (3.219)  3.533)  (1.699)  (3.460)  (3.906)  (1.609)  (0.189) 
Gastil index  -0.530  0.234  -0.064  0.124  0.828
** 0.027  10.63 
 (0.277)  (0.314)  (0.152)  (0.306)  (0.340)  (0.141)  (0.059) 
Bilateral relation indicators: 
Geogr. Distance  1.109
** -0.252  -0.287  0.475  0.890    7.70 
 (0.525)  (0.779)  (0.211)  (0.586)  (0.798)    (0.103) 




***   10.56 
 (3.982)  (10.393)  (4.157)  (7.067)  (11.059)    (0.032) 
Former colony        5.712
***      
       (2.161)       
              
              
Nr. Obs  270  269  270  270  270  270   
              
Log likelihood  -622.666  -592.350  -813.982  -502.114  -476.812  -832.104   
LR chi2  79.534  92.179  109.050  153.032  117.691  104.074   
p-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Notes:             
(A) Additional controls in all specifications: region, disaster type and year dummies. All models include a constant term. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
(B)  Wald test of equal coefficients across donors. p -values in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. 
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Dependent variable: Pr(Donor j provides aid after disaster i  =1) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 US  Japan  Germany  UK  Norway 
        
Number of major donors  0.192**  0.155**  0.336***  0.331***  0.254*** 
  (0.077) (0.068) (0.102) (0.074)  (0.069) 
Impact measures        
Log(Nr.affected) 0.013  -0.014  -0.015  0.001  0.016 
  (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016)  (0.016) 
Log(Nr.  Killed)  -0.006 0.052** -0.014 -0.014  -0.023 
 (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.026)  (0.029) 
Socio economic indicators:        
Log(Population) 0.046  -0.042  0.065  -0.023  -0.076* 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.051) (0.036)  (0.041) 
Pop. density  0.000  -0.001***  0.000  0.000  0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Log (GDP per capita)  -0.003  0.037  0.008  -0.026  0.005 
  (0.057) (0.052) (0.062) (0.054)  (0.058) 
Oil  dummy  0.118 -0.273*** -0.080  0.043 0.149* 
 (0.090)  (0.086)  (0.116)  (0.091)  (0.086) 
        
Trade openness  0.002  0.001  0.000  -0.002  -0.003* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
ELF index  0.002  0.010  0.015  0.246  -0.231 
  (0.145) (0.146) (0.171) (0.160)  (0.166) 
Gastil index  -0.036***  0.008  -0.011  -0.004  0.034** 
 (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Bilateral Variables        
Geograph. Distance  0.032  0.006  -0.122***  0.009  -0.004 
  (0.024) (0.036) (0.039) (0.032)  (0.033) 
Affinity index  -0.027  -0.091  0.079  -0.104  -0.359 
  (0.166) (0.432) (0.394) (0.226)  (0.429) 
Former colony        0.043   
       (0.112)   
          
Observations 269  269  269  269  269 
Centered R-squared  0.31  0.42  0.13  0.43  0.29 
Hansen OID Test  0.14  0.39  0.42  0.98  0.36 
Cragg-Donald F-Stat  7.21  8.20  4.56  5.47  5.66 
Notes: 
2SLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All specifications include year, regional and disaster type fixed effects. 
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Aid  Total aid per emergency (2000 US$-PPP) 
  SOURCE: FTS – own calculations 
Impact measures: 
Nr. affected  People requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.  
  SOURCE: EM-DAT 
Nr. Killed  Persons confirmed dead and persons missing and presumed dead 
  SOURCE: EM-DAT 
Socio-economic indicators: 
Population  Population (one year lag) 
  SOURCE: WDI 
Population density  Nr. of people per square km (one year lag) 
  SOURCE: WDI 
GDP per cap  Per capita GDP (one year lag; 2000 US$-PPP) 
  SOURCE: WDI – own calculations 
Oil Dummy  Dummy = 1 if oil exports exceeds 1/3 of total exports 
  SOURCE: WDI – own calculations 
Policy performance indicators: 
Trade openness  (Import + Exports) / GDP  (one year lag; 2000 US$-PPP) 
  SOURCE: WDI – own calculations 
ELF index  Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index. Range from 0 (least fract.) to 1 (more 
fract.) 
  SOURCE: Fearon and Laitin, 2003 
Gastil index  Democratization index. Sum of political rights and civil liberties indexes. 
Both indexes range between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free) 
  SOURCE: Freedom House 
Bilateral  relations indicators: 
Affinity index  Affinity index in UNGA recipient - donor voting. Ranges from -1 (least 
similar) to 1(more similar). (one year lag) 
  SOURCE: Gartzke, 2002 
Geogr. distance  Donor – recipient’s capital cities distance 
  SOURCE: Gleditsch and Ward, 2001 
Former colony   Dummy = 1 if recipient was donor’s colony 
  SOURCE: Fearon and Laitin, 2003 
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
         
Give:  USA  449  0.51  0.50 0 1 
Give:  Japan  449  0.46  0.50 0 1 
Give:  Germany  449  0.43  0.50 0 1 
Give:  UK  449  0.43  0.50 0 1 
Give:  Norway  449  0.37  0.48 0 1 
Give:  Private  449  0.57  0.50 0 1 
(Log) Aid: USA  449  6.00  6.11  0  18.27 
(Log) Aid: Japan  449  5.68  6.24  0  16.85 
(Log) Aid: Germany  449  5.06  5.91  0  16.60 
(Log) Aid: UK  449  5.24  6.09  0  18.26 
(Log) Aid: Norway  449  4.28  5.61  0  15.50 
(Log) Aid: Private  449  6.95  6.23  0  18.12 
(Log) Nr. killed  386  4.05  1.98  0.00  10.31 
(Log) Nr. affected  447  11.16  2.60  2.30  19.22 
(Log)  Population  435  16.87  2.04 11.24 20.97 
Pop. density  432  128.26  172.94  1.39  1049.52 
(Log) GDP per capita  424  8.02  0.78  6.04  10.09 
Oil  dummy  381  0.24  0.43 0.00 1.00 
Trade as % of GDP  408  65.93  33.87  2.58  213.33 
ELF  index  354  0.47  0.28 0.00 0.93 
Gastil 405  8.23  3.51  2.00  14.00 
Affinity index: US  438  -0.22  0.30  -0.60  1 
Affinity index: Japan  436  0.57  0.15  0.23  1 
Affinity index: Germany  438  0.50  0.19  0.18  1 
Affinity index: UK  438  0.34  0.21  -0.13  1 
Affinity index: Norway  438  0.53  0.17  0.21  1 
Distance: US ('000)  441  9.87  4.03  1.62  16.34 
Distance: Japan ('000)  439  8.88  4.39  1.17  18.54 
Distance: Germany ('000)  441  7.57  3.27  0.52  16.36 
Distance: UK ('000)  441  7.75  3.16  1.02  16.33 
Distance: Norway ('000)  441  7.60  3.08  1.02  15.33 
         
 
  32Table A.3: Panel: OLS Regressions 
   
Dependent variable: Pr(Donor j provides aid after disaster i  =1) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 






Impact measures       
Log(Nr.affected)  0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026***   
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)   
Log(Nr.  Killed)  0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060***   
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
Socio economic indicators:       
Log(Population)  -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.052***   
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)   
Pop.  density  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Log (GDP per capita)  -0.034***  -0.034***  -0.035***   
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)   
Oil  dummy  0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088***   
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)   
Policy performance indicators      
Trade  openness  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
ELF  index  -0.019 -0.019 -0.004   
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.030)   
Gastil  index  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001   
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)   
Bilateral relation indicators      
Geograph. Distance  -0.004  -0.004  -0.008***  -0.011*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Affinity  index  -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.316***  -0.350*** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.053)  (0.087) 
Former  colony  0.154*** 0.154*** 0.162***  0.164*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)  (0.026) 
       
Donor FE  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Disaster  FE  NO NO NO  NO 
       
Observations  5153 5153 5153  5153 
R-squared  0.18 0.18 0.16  0.20 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All specifications include year, regional and disaster type fixed effects. 
The donors included are.Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US 
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Dependent variable: Number of Other Main Donors Providing Aid to Disaster i 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 US  Japan  Germany  UK  Norway 
Instruments          
Distance US    0.750***  -0.270  0.619**  -0.300 
   (0.267)  (0.375)  (0.260)  (0.359) 
Distance Japan  0.330**    0.574***  0.353**  0.684*** 
 (0.165)    (0.178)  (0.151)  (0.178) 
Distance Germany          -8.222*** 
         (2.116) 
Distance UK  -9.411*  -11.988***  -1.403    -1.826 
 (5.097)  (4.575)  (5.483)    (5.059) 
Distance Norway  8.869*  11.387***  9.562**  10.065**   
 (4.854)  (4.361)  (4.681)  (4.148)   
          
          
Impact measures          
Log(Nr.affected) 0.138***  0.159***  0.114**  0.127***  0.095** 
  (0.047) (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.042) 
Log(Nr. Killed)  0.330***  0.298***  0.327***  0.311***  0.355*** 
 (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.043) 
Socio economic 
indicators: 
        
Log(Population) -0.409***  -0.381*** -0.362*** -0.312***  -0.262*** 
  (0.096) (0.094)  (0.096)  (0.090)  (0.093) 
Pop. density  0.000  0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Log (GDP per capita)  -0.317*  -0.288* -0.305* -0.222  -0.355** 
  (0.162) (0.155)  (0.160)  (0.160)  (0.161) 
Oil dummy  0.296  0.629***  0.387  0.386  0.215 
 (0.238)  (0.233)  (0.258)  (0.245)  (0.249) 
        
Trade openness  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002  0.000 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
ELF index  -0.238  -0.308  -0.530  -0.477  -0.457 
  (0.419) (0.443)  (0.440)  (0.442)  (0.464) 
Gastil index  0.048  0.002  -0.004  0.015  -0.044 
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.039) 
        
Geograph. Distance  0.644**  0.400***  -7.903***  -10.550**  10.236** 
  (0.291) (0.153)  (2.071)  (4.348)  (4.258) 
Affinity index  -1.320***  -3.144***  -2.422***  -1.371**  -2.388*** 
  (0.431) (1.049)  (0.794)  (0.693)  (0.886) 
Former colony        0.211   
       (0.276)   
          
Observations 269  269  269  269  269 
R-squared 0.44  0.41  0.41  0.38  0.41 
Cragg-Donald F-Stat  7.21  8.20  4.56  5.47  5.66 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All specifications include year, regional and disaster type fixed effects. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Source: EM-DAT Emergency Disasters Data Base 
2 Among others, the UNDP’s Disaster Risk Index Project (DRI) was designed to improve the understanding 
of the relationship between development and disaster risk, and to provide country vulnerability analysis 
during the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2001. More recently, the international 
community has recognized disaster risk management as an integral part of the development agenda (2005 
World Conference for Disaster Reduction, Kobe, Japan). 
3 As explained in Section 3 of the paper, rapid onset emergencies last only for very short periods of time, 
thus limiting potential feedback effects from aid on the actual impact of the hazard. 
4 The estimated coefficients on other donors’ aid are positive in Tobit estimates, but negative when only the 
initial selection equation is estimated using Probit models. 
5 The DAC list is reviewed every three years. As of 2005, this list includes all low and middle income 
countries, except those that are members of the G8 or the European Union (or countries with a firm date for 
EU admission, i.e. Bulgaria and Romania). 
6 The official definition of a complex emergency is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society 
where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and 
which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency 
and/ or the ongoing United Nations country program.” (IASC, 1994). 
7 http://www.em-dat.net/. 
8 8http://www.em-dat.net/glossary.htm 
9 The EM-DAT database includes figures on the "estimated damage" in US dollars. However, given the 
absence of a standard procedure to quantify the economic impact, and considering the number of missing 
values for this variable, we decided to rely exclusively on figures of emergencies’ human impact. 
10 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is mandated to 
coordinate the international humanitarian response to a natural disaster or complex emergency acting on the 
basis of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182. (http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/index.aspx) 
11 Since its creation in 1998, the OCHA has the responsibility to issue an international appeal for aid when 
requested by affected governments. The Consolidated Appeal is the reference document on the 
humanitarian strategy and the funding requirements through which the OCHA coordinates and mobilize 
humanitarian aid in response to natural disasters and complex emergencies. 
12 As pointed out by Randel and German (2002), the bulk of humanitarian assistance has been spent on 
complex emergencies in recent years. For instance, in 2001, the 20 countries appealing for complex 
emergencies raised a total pledge of $2.1 bn as opposed to a total contribution of only $311.2m received by 
the 49 countries hit by natural disasters. 
13 The numbers are denominated in real 2000 US$ at PPP and do not include the December 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami. The Tsunami has triggered unprecedented aid flows of over US$ 12 bn - about four times 
the amount of emergency aid provided to all of the disasters in our sample - and therefore is hardly 
comparable with the typical disaster in our sample. 
14 People affected are defined as those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation; 
people killed are persons confirmed dead and persons missing or presumed dead (source: EM-DAT). See 
Table A1 in the Appendix. 
15 The 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador and Seattle in the United States resulted in losses of around US$ 2 
billion each. While these losses were easily absorbed by the U.S. economy, they represented 15 percent of 
El Salvador’s GDP for that year (United Nations, 2004). 
 
16 The "political rights" index assesses the right to vote, election meaningfulness, multiple political parties, 
opposition power, and government independence from foreign or military control. The "civil liberties" 
index covers the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion and freedom from terrorism or discrimination. 
 
17 For computational purposes we restrict the analysis to the sample of 20 OECD donors consisting of 
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US. 
18 An alternative to the Tobit would be an Heckman selection model. In the Heckman model, the inverse 
Mill’s ratio estimated in a first stage Probit is used to correct for selection in the allocation equation (see   36
                                                                                                                                                 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) for a detailed discussion). In the absence of obvious exclusion restrictions 
(factors that matter 
in the selection, but not in the allocation equation) we opt for a Tobit specification of the allocation 
equation. 
19 We test the null of zero coefficients of all donor fixed effects and reject it at the 99% level. The Wald test 
for all coefficients equal to zero reports a chi-square statistic of 308.35. 
20 For example, if one assumes that the main unobservable is emergencies’ media coverage, it is easy to 
imagine some positive correlation between the unobservable effect and our disaster impact measures. 
21 Note that Table 1 shows some Probit and some Logit coefficient estimates which are not directly 
comparable in terms of magnitude. 
22 Trumbull and Wall (1994) argue that smaller populations also imply a higher per capita impact of aid. 
23 The ethical fractionalization index (ELF) ranges from 0 (least fractionalized) to 1 (most fractionalized). 
See Appendix Table A.2. 
24 All other controls are kept to their mean value. Summary statistics in the Appendix (TableA2). 